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RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 The Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) found 
that Joshim Uddin, a citizen and native of Bangladesh, was 
ineligible for withholding of removal because he was a 
member of the Bangladesh National Party (“BNP”), a major 
political party in his homeland. According to the Board, the 
BNP qualified as a Tier III terrorist organization under the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). Thus, Uddin’s membership in the BNP 
rendered him ineligible for relief. 
 
 While we will deny the petition for review challenging 
the Board’s ruling dismissing Uddin’s Convention Against 
Torture (“CAT”) claim, we will grant the petition in part and 
remand on his withholding of removal claim. The Board has 
pointed to terrorist acts by BNP members. But it did not find 
that BNP leadership authorized any of the terrorist activity 
committed by party members. Today, we join the reasoning 
of the Seventh Circuit and the Board in many of its own 
opinions by holding as follows: unless the agency finds that 
party leaders authorized terrorist activity committed by its 
members, an entity such as the BNP cannot be deemed a Tier 
III terrorist organization. 
 
 
 
 I. Statutory Background 
 The so-called “terrorism bar” precludes aliens who are 
members of “terrorist organizations” from seeking several 
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forms of relief, including withholding of removal. See 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i), (vi); 1227(a)(4)(B); 
1158(b)(2)(A)(v); 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv). 
 
 The INA, in turn, establishes three different kinds of 
terrorist organizations.  
 
 Tier I terrorist organizations are officially listed 
groups designated by the Secretary of State. 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I) & 1189. Such groups are maintained on 
an official register, and are thus easily identifiable to 
immigration authorities.  
 
 Tier II terrorist organizations are groups that have 
engaged in terrorist activity, and are designated by the 
Secretary of State in consultation with or upon the request of 
the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
for purposes of immigration exclusion. 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II). Such groups are maintained on an 
official register, and are thus also easily identifiable to 
immigration authorities. 
 
 Tier III terrorist organizations, the groups at issue in 
this case, are groups “of two or more individuals, whether 
organized or not, which engage[] in, or [have] a subgroup 
which engages in,” terrorist activity. 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). Terrorist activity is defined broadly by 
the statute as conduct “unlawful under the laws of the place 
where it is committed (or which, if it had been committed in 
the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the 
United States or any State)” and which involves one of 
several enumerated actions, including the “highjacking or 
sabotage of any conveyance,” “an assassination,” use of any 
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“biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or 
device, or [ ] explosive, firearm, or other weapon or 
dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary 
gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety 
of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to 
property,” or a “threat, attempt, or conspiracy to” commit 
such acts. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
 
 There is no official register of Tier III organizations; 
instead, groups are adjudicated as Tier III organizations on a 
case-by-case basis. 
 
 A. Assessing Tier III Status  
 There is relatively little guidance from Courts of 
Appeals as to how to determine whether an organization is a 
Tier III terrorist group. But, from a procedural standpoint, 
departmental regulations set forth a burden-shifting structure 
for adjudicating such cases. First, the Government must 
introduce evidence “indicat[ing]” that a group qualifies as a 
Tier III terrorist organization. Then, the burden shifts to the 
applicant to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence” that 
the bar does not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2).  
 
 If an alien is deemed a member of a Tier III 
organization, then he can avoid the terrorism bar if he can 
“demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that [he] did 
not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the 
organization was a terrorist organization.” 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI).  
 
 II. Factual Background  
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 A. Events in Bangladesh 
 The BNP, led by Khaleda Zia since 1984, is one of 
Bangladesh’s two major political parties; the other is the 
Awami League (AL). Both groups have been in and out of 
power over the past several decades: From 2001 to 2006, the 
BNP was in power. From approximately 2006-2008, a 
military-backed government ruled the country to oversee free 
and fair elections. In late 2008, the AL won a decisive victory 
to lead the country. In January 2014, the most recent election, 
the AL maintained its hold on power, despite significant 
protests and demonstrations by the BNP as to the election’s 
fairness.  
 
 Uddin joined the BNP in February 2008, when the 
group was no longer in power. Soon after, he was promoted 
to general secretary for his district. In this position, he 
distributed posters and recruited college students. 
 
 Uddin claims that on several occasions, members of 
the AL persecuted him on account of his political beliefs. 
First, he asserts that on December 1, 2008, ten members of 
the AL approached him while he was hanging BNP posters 
with colleagues. When he refused to stop hanging posters, the 
AL members allegedly beat him, resulting in injuries to his 
face that a doctor treated with stitches.  
 Second, he claims that in March 2009, AL members 
broke his leg with a hockey stick.1 Third, Uddin asserted that 
AL members threatened to kill him in October 2009 if he did 
                                              
1 A doctor’s statement, prepared in May 2016 for Uddin’s 
immigration litigation, supports the contention that Uddin’s 
ankle was broken with a hockey stick in 2009. 
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not stop working for the BNP, and that AL members 
threatened him again in November and March 2010.  
 
 Finally, Uddin alleged that on July 15, 2011, between 
ten and fifteen AL members broke into to his home and 
burned it down. Uddin had escaped through the back door. In 
October 2011, Uddin fled Bangladesh.  
 
 B. Events in the United States 
 After traveling through more than a half-dozen 
countries, Uddin entered the United States illegally in 2013. 
He eventually settled in Brooklyn, New York. In 2015, he 
attended “about one or two” meetings of BNP members in the 
United States. AR 155. 
 
 Later in 2015, Uddin was arrested in New Jersey for 
charges that were eventually dismissed in state court, 
including selling untaxed cigarettes and possession of 
marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and a weapon (brass 
knuckles). After he posted bail, immigration officers arrested 
him on January 28, 2016, and served him with a Notice to 
Appear charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (alien present in United States without 
having been admitted or paroled by an immigration officer).  
 
 C. IJ Proceedings 
 At his hearing before an Immigration Judge, Uddin 
conceded his removability as charged. But he filed a 
defensive application for asylum, withholding of removal, 
and CAT protection. Eventually he conceded, through 
counsel, that he was ineligible for asylum because his 
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application was untimely, and that he did not qualify for an 
exception to the one-year deadline set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(a)(2)(B).2 But Uddin maintained that he was eligible for 
withholding of removal and CAT protection. He argued that 
because of his affiliation with the BNP, he would face 
persecution if returned to Bangladesh on account of his 
political beliefs.  
 
 The IJ denied Uddin’s application for relief.3 He found 
that Uddin was ineligible for withholding of removal because 
he was a knowing member of a Tier III terrorist organization, 
the BNP. The IJ found “abundant [record] evidence from 
reliable sources that the BNP has used violence for political 
purposes in the past.” AR 71.  
 
 Describing that “abundant” evidence, the IJ first 
quoted a Congressional Research Services report on 
Bangladesh saying that “[p]olitical violence has long been 
part of the political landscape in Bangladesh.” AR 71. He 
further noted that Uddin’s own evidence stated that former 
                                              
2 Uddin has not appealed the denial of his asylum claim. 
3 The IJ made a “mixed” credibility finding. He found Uddin 
“credible as to his support for the BNP, but not reliable or 
credible as to specific alleged events that form the basis for 
his claim of past persecution and fear or persecution.” AR 63. 
The IJ observed that Uddin “testified in a manner which tends 
to indicate he had memorized [his] narrative.” AR 62. 
Further, Uddin apparently misstated significant facts about 
political elections in Bangladesh during the time he was 
supposedly an active party member. The IJ also noted 
shortcomings in Uddin’s corroborating evidence: most of it 
was prepared for his immigration litigation.  
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opposition parties were “quick to take revenge on their 
outgoing rivals . . . often in the form of violent attacks.” Id. 
(emphases omitted). 
 
 Next, the IJ relied on a report stating that while in 
power from 2001 to 2006, the BNP “was criticized for its 
tacit support of radical Islamic groups,” which were 
reportedly behind bomb blasts in 2005. AR 72. Then, the IJ 
cited evidence that the BNP had created the Rapid Action 
Battalion (“RAB”) while in power, which it used as an 
extrajudicial “death squad” during its last term in office. AR 
72.4  
 
 Finally, and most importantly, the IJ found evidence 
that BNP activists resorted to “massive violence including the 
torching of dozens of polling centers” during the 2013-2014 
election cycle. AR 72 (citation omitted). The IJ emphasized 
that the BNP’s leader, Khaleda Zia, had “announced the party 
would hold a series of general strikes and traffic blockades 
halting transport links to the capital.”5 AR 73. During these 
strikes, according to an “authoritative” report by the NGO 
Human Rights Watch, “opposition party workers” (i) burned 
a truck driver’s wife and baby alive by “fail[ing] to allow 
enough time for [them] to escape the vehicle;” (ii) killed four 
                                              
4 After the BNP left power, it did not maintain control of the 
RAB. Currently, the AL controls the RAB.  
5 The Human Rights Watch Report attributed strike violence 
to “opposition activists,” AR 301, rather than to the BNP 
specifically. But the IJ believed that there was evidence to 
conclude “opposition activists” meant the BNP, since the 
BNP was the “largest party in the opposition coalition.” AR 
75. 
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people by throwing a bomb onto a bus they were riding; (iii) 
badly burned a thirteen-year-old boy by torching the bus he 
worked on; and (iv) injured a seven-year-old’s hand, legs, and 
abdomen by throwing a bomb in front of him. AR 73.6 The IJ 
also discussed opposition supporters’ “leaving homemade 
grenades on the streets, wrapped in colorful paper, which 
were picked up by children.” AR 73. Opposition workers also 
purportedly attacked polling centers to hamper voter turnout 
in the 2014 election. Because the BNP “used violence for 
political purposes to an extent that constitutes engaging in 
terrorist activity,” the IJ found that the party was a Tier III 
terrorist organization. AR 75 (emphasis omitted). 
 Turning to the CAT claim, the IJ found that Uddin was 
ineligible for relief because he “failed to establish a 
probability of torture, given weaknesses in his credibility and 
corroborating evidence.” AR 77.  
 
 D. Board Proceedings 
                                              
6 Analyzing whether Uddin had proved that he did not, or 
should not have known, that the BNP was a terrorist 
organization, the IJ opined that before Uddin joined, the BNP 
used political violence, and created the RAB. While he was 
active, the party took no “known action to abandon its history 
of violence.” AR 75. After he joined, BNP activists resorted 
to massive violence including torching polling centers. Based 
on this history, notwithstanding Uddin’s sworn testimony that 
he did not know about BNP members’ violent acts, the IJ 
found that Uddin “could not have joined the BNP and served 
as a publicity officer without being aware of [its] history [of 
violence].” AR 76.  
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 Uddin appealed to the Board, which dismissed his 
claim. To start, the Board noted that Uddin had not 
“meaningfully challenged” the IJ’s decision denying his 
request for protection under CAT. AR 3 n.1. He did not 
mention the IJ’s denial of CAT protection in his Notice of 
Appeal, and made only two passing references to CAT 
protection in his brief to the Board. Thus, the Board 
“deem[ed] [the] claim waived on appeal.” Id.  
 
 Next, the Board agreed with the IJ that Uddin was 
ineligible for withholding of removal as a member of a Tier 
III terrorist organization. The Board highlighted Uddin’s 
admitted membership in the BNP, and his continued support 
for the organization even after he entered the United States.  
 
 The Board also found that the record reflected 
“abundant evidence” that the BNP had used violence for 
political purposes in the past, including its creation of the 
RAB which it employed as a “death squad” while in power. 
AR 4. It noted the “deadly results of the campaign to disrupt 
the Bengali election in January 2014.” AR 4. The Board 
further emphasized that the BNP leader “publicly announced 
a plan to obstruct the 2014 election by strikes, boycotts, and 
blockades.” AR. 4. And, like the IJ, the Board stated that 
“party officers” employed forms of violence which resulted in 
death and serious injury.7 AR 4.  
 
                                              
7 The Board noted that it did not address the IJ’s 
determination regarding credibility, because it had found that 
the terrorism bar applied. 
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 III. Analysis8 
 A. CAT Claim 
 Uddin urges that the Board erred in refusing to review 
his CAT claim. We disagree. In his Notice of Appeal, Uddin 
did not mention the CAT claim. And he made only passing 
reference to CAT twice in his brief the Board.9 Because he 
provided the Board no way to identify his grievance with the 
IJ’s CAT ruling, the Board dismissed the claim.  
 
 We review such dismissals for abuse of discretion: the 
Board, in its discretion, may determine “when to summarily 
dismiss an appeal for lack of specificity and when the BIA is 
sufficiently appraised of the appealable issues to entertain the 
appeal.” Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 124 (3d Cir. 2008); 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i) (stating that the Board “may 
summarily dismiss any appeal or portion of any appeal . . . 
[that] fails to specify the reasons for the appeal . . . .”); see 
also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(b) (an alien “must specifically identify 
the findings of fact, the conclusions of law, or both that are 
being challenged” to avoid summary dismissal). Here, it is 
clear that the Board did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 
Uddin’s undefined CAT claim: Uddin provided the Board no 
basis for ruling on his vague objection to the IJ’s CAT denial. 
 
                                              
8 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The 
Board’s jurisdiction arose under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) & 
1240.15. 
9 Uddin simply stated twice that the IJ “summarily dismissed 
[Uddin’s] claim under the [CAT] with little to no analysis 
given to the claim.” AR 10 & 14. 
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 On appeal, Uddin seems to argue that the Board found 
his claim “waived,” and not “summarily dismissed,” and that 
thus we do not review for abuse of discretion. We disagree. 
While the Board may not have used the magic words 
“summarily dismiss,” it was clearly unable to address Uddin’s 
claim because it could not discern Uddin’s grievance with the 
IJ’s CAT ruling, and it dismissed the claim on those 
grounds.10 Even when pressed at oral argument, Uddin’s 
attorney was unable to articulate the basis of his objection to 
the IJ’s CAT analysis.11 
 
 Uddin additionally argues that by challenging the IJ’s 
adverse credibility finding, he implicitly challenged the CAT 
ruling, since the IJ’s CAT ruling had discussed the adverse 
credibility finding. We do not agree that there was a clear line 
connecting a challenge to the IJ’s credibility analysis to the 
IJ’s CAT analysis, such that the Board should have divined 
Uddin’s argument. In Lin, the petitioner made a somewhat 
similar argument to the effect that when one issue implicates 
another in the case, raising one of the issues puts the Board on 
notice as to the other. 543 F.3d at 122. We rejected that 
argument and do not credit it here. The Board had no way of 
                                              
10 At oral argument, Uddin’s attorney seems to have conceded 
that the Board in fact “summarily dismissed” the CAT claim, 
but then later argued that the Board had instead found the 
claim “waived.” 
11 In his brief before us, Uddin stated that his reference to the 
CAT claim in his brief before the Board is “sufficient for 
exhaustion.” Brief at 11. But exhaustion, which implicates 
our jurisdiction, Lin, 543 F.3d at 120, is not at issue here. 
Instead, we are assessing whether the Board properly 
summarily dismissed the CAT claim. 
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knowing that, by challenging the adverse credibility finding, 
Uddin was challenging the IJ’s CAT ruling. Thus, Uddin’s 
CAT claim fails.  
 
 B. Withholding of Removal  
  (i) Standard of Review 
 We review the legal determination of whether a group 
falls within the definition of an undesignated terrorist 
organization de novo. Findings of fact underlying this 
determination are reviewed to determine if they are supported 
by substantial evidence, meaning that we will “uphold the 
agency’s determination unless the evidence would compel 
any reasonable fact finder to reach a contrary result.” Sesay v. 
Att’y Gen., 787 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Gonazalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 684 n.5 (3d 
Cir. 2015)). When, as here, the “BIA’s opinion directly states 
that the BIA is deferring to the IJ, or invokes specific aspects 
of the IJ’s analysis and factfinding in support of the BIA’s 
conclusions,” we review both decisions. Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y 
Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Voci v. 
Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 613 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
 
 
 
 
  (ii) Analysis 
 As discussed, the Board found that Uddin was 
ineligible for withholding of relief because he was a member 
of a Tier III terrorist organization. But while the IJ and Board 
pointed to evidence of terrorist activity committed by 
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members of the BNP,12 it did not, as it has in many of its 
rulings, discuss whether the specified terrorist acts were 
                                              
12 Although there is evidence in the record as to terrorist 
activity by BNP members from 2013-2015, the record is less 
clear as to terrorist acts committed by BNP members between 
2008 and 2011, when Uddin was a member in Bangladesh. 
Pressed at oral argument as to what evidence of terrorist acts 
were in the record while Uddin was in Bangladesh, counsel 
directed us to a single page from a report by the Immigration 
and Refugee Board of Canada.  AR 237.  
 That report states that one source consulted reported 
“135 individuals having been killed and 11,532 persons 
having been injured due to political violence between January 
and December 2011.” But the report immediately notes 
thereafter: “Corroborating Information could not be found 
among the sources consulted . . .” AR 237 (emphasis added). 
Further, as the Government’s counsel conceded, the report 
does not attribute the political violence referenced to the 
BNP. That this was the most damning evidence the 
Government could cite at argument from a 734-page record 
makes us question the BNP’s status a terrorist organization 
during the years 2008-2011. But because Uddin continued his 
active membership in the BNP even after he arrived in the 
United States, we also look to the BNP’s actions from 2011-
2015. 
 We note, however, that evidence of RAB’s violence 
conduct that predated Uddin’s membership in the BNP is not 
relevant to the determination of the BNP’s Tier III status 
while he was a member. The BNP has not controlled the RAB 
since approximately two years before Uddin even joined the 
party. In fact, the Human Rights Watch Report states that 
since the BNP has been a minority party, the government has 
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actually authorized. Today, we hold that absent such a finding 
regarding authorization by a group’s leaders, Tier III status 
cannot be assigned to a group. We will thus remand for the 
Board to address this issue.  
 
 We find support for our ruling in the statutory text, the 
Board’s own rulings and those of the Seventh Circuit, and 
common sense. To start, the relevant statute defines a Tier III 
terrorist organization as a “group of two or more individuals” 
that engages in terrorist activity, or a group that “has a 
subgroup” that engages in terrorist activity. 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (emphases added). Had the statute 
stated that a Tier III terrorist organization is “a group whose 
members engage in terrorist activity,” then a group’s Tier III 
designation could be based on the individual actions of its 
members, regardless of authorization. But the text speaks to 
concerted actions of a group, not uncoordinated activities by 
individual members: an organization receives Tier III status 
only if a group itself engages in terrorist activity. A rule that 
there must be evidence of authorization from party leaders is 
most faithful to that statutory text.  
 Second, the rule we announce mirrors the Board’s own 
reasoning in the mine-run of its cases involving the BNP’s 
status as a Tier III organization. In fact, in some cases where 
IJs did not make a finding as to BNP leaders’ authorization of 
allegedly terrorist acts, the Board found error in the IJs’ 
omissions, and remanded to the IJs to take up that very 
question of authorization. In such cases, the Board bolstered 
                                                                                                     
used the RAB to conduct numerous extra-judicial killings of 
BNP members. Thus, for purposes of the BNP’s status as a 
terrorist organization, the RAB’s conduct cannot be ascribed 
to that group during the time period relevant to Uddin’s case.   
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its reasoning by referencing Seventh Circuit opinions 
suggesting that some finding on authorization is necessary to 
assign a group Tier III status. See Khan v. Holder, 766 F.3d 
689, 699 (7th Cir. 2014) (“An entire organization does not 
automatically become a terrorist organization just because 
some members of the group commit terrorist acts. The 
question is one of authorization.”); Hussain v. Mukasey, 518 
F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 2008) (“An organization is not a 
terrorist organization just because one of its members 
commits an act of armed violence without direct or indirect 
authorization . . . .”). 
 
 Third, requiring a finding of authorization simply 
formalizes common sense notions as to what a terrorist 
organization is. If a single member of the Democratic or 
Republican Party committed a terrorist act, we would not 
impute terrorist status to the entire group, absent some 
showing that party leadership authorized the act. So too here, 
it cannot be that the acts of any single member of the BNP 
can transform the organization into a terrorist group.13 Judge 
Posner explained why this is so in Hussain: 
If an activity is not authorized, ratified, or otherwise 
approved or condoned by the organization, then the 
                                              
13 Violent outbreaks by both BNP and AL members seem to 
color the political landscape of Bangladesh leading up to 
elections. The BNP and AL are the two major political parties 
in that country, and dominate political life there. Thus, 
following the Board’s reasoning in this case which suggests 
that both parties qualify as terrorist organizations, it appears 
that a large swath of Bengali aliens who are members of these 
parties would be ineligible for most forms of immigration 
relief. This gives us pause.  
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organization is not the actor. It may be liable under the 
principles of agency law, even criminally liable, for a 
harm done by one of its employees or other agents, as 
when an employee commits a tort within the course of 
his employment although not authorized to do so by 
his employer. But that does not mean that the 
employer “engaged in” the employee’s act. An 
organization is not a terrorist organization just because 
one of its members commits an act of armed violence 
without direct or indirect authorization, even if his 
objective was to advance the organization’s goals, 
though the organization might be held liable to the 
victim of his violent act. 
518 F.3d at 538 (citations omitted).  
 Further, today’s ruling should help provide the Board a 
principled method of adjudicating Tier III cases, an area of 
law with little guidance from the Courts of Appeals. This 
dearth of precedential opinions has resulted in highly 
inconsistent results regarding the BNP’s status as a terrorist 
organization: our preliminary research in preparation for oral 
argument turned up several Board rulings concluding that the 
BNP was not in fact a terrorist organization. These 
conclusions were in stark contrast to the Board’s finding in 
Uddin’s case. 
 Faced with these contradictory opinions, in advance of 
oral argument we asked the Government to submit all Board 
opinions from 2015-2017 addressing the terrorism bar as it 
applies to the BNP. (Those opinions are not all publicly 
available.) The Government’s submission—fifty-four 
opinions in total—did not bolster our confidence in the 
Board’s adjudication of these cases. 
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 In six of the opinions, the Board agreed with the IJ that 
the BNP qualified as a terrorist organization based on the 
record in that case. But in at least ten, the Board concluded 
that the BNP was not a terrorist organization. In at least five 
cases, the Government did not challenge the IJ’s 
determination that the BNP is not a terrorist organization. 
And in one case, the Board reversed its own prior 
determination, finding that that “the Board’s last decision 
incorrectly affirmed the Immigration Judge’s finding that the 
BNP is a Tier III terrorist organization.” Many of the cases 
discussed the BNP’s terrorist status during the same time 
periods, reaching radically different results.  
 
 We recognize that the Board’s decisions are 
unpublished, and thus lack precedential value. We also note 
the Government’s argument that the BNP’s status as an 
undesignated terrorist organization is a “case-specific” 
determination based on the facts presented. That said, 
something is amiss where, time and time again, the Board 
finds the BNP is a terrorist organization one day, and reaches 
the exact opposite conclusion the next.  
 
 Even more concerning, the IJ in this case stated that he 
was “aware of no BIA or circuit court decision to date which 
has considered whether the BNP constitutes a terrorist 
organization.” AR 68. At the time the IJ ruled, there were 
several such decisions, and now there are dozens. When 
asked at oral argument whether the IJ could access 
unpublished Board decisions regarding BNP’s terrorist status, 
the Government’s Attorney responded that he did not know. 
This is a troubling state of affairs. 
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 Still, the rule we announce today does not always 
require that the Government produce conclusive proof that 
the leader(s) of a group explicitly sign off on each individual 
terrorist act at issue. Instead, as the Board itself has opined in 
several cases, “[e]vidence of authorization may be direct or 
circumstantial, and authorization may be reasonably inferred 
from, among other things, the fact that most of an 
organization’s members commit terrorist activity or from a 
failure of a group’s leadership to condemn or curtail its 
members’ terrorist acts.” Addendum at 6. As we have stated, 
what constitutes a Tier III terrorist organization is adjudicated 
on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, what constitutes 
authorization under the rule we announce today must also be 
determined case-by-case. Whether words, acts, or silences 
amount to authorization must depend on context, including, 
but not limited to, the structure of the organization, the 
relationship between the organization and its members, and 
the information each has about the other. As long as the 
agency finds as a matter of fact that the allegedly terroristic 
acts were authorized by party leaders, we review that 
determination for clear error.  
 
 Because neither the IJ nor the Board in this case 
addressed whether the terrorist activity was authorized by 
party leadership,14 we will grant the petition on the 
withholding of removal claim and remand. On remand, the 
                                              
14 Both the IJ and the Board made scattered comments 
suggesting that authorization might have been an element of 
their findings. But, unlike in other BIA cases, neither 
explicitly addressed the issue of authorization. Nor do they 
affirmatively establish that BNP leaders authorized the 
actions that were terroristic. 
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Board should determine whether the BNP’s leadership has 
authorized its members to engage in the referenced terrorist 
activity. 
 
 IV. Conclusion 
 The INA contemplates that we afford some deference 
to the Board’s expertise in matters of immigration. But when 
the Board’s inconsistency leaves us guessing as to its actual 
position on a matter, we think it merits a closer look. The 
question of authorization is, as the Board itself has found, a 
necessary part of the Tier III inquiry. Thus, we will grant the 
petition and remand on the withholding claim. On the CAT 
claim, we will deny the petition.  
 
GREENAWAY, JR., concurring.  
 I join the Court’s opinion in full.  We hold that groups 
may only be deemed Tier III terrorist organizations based on 
the terrorist activities of their members if the groups authorized 
those activities.  I write separately to clarify and expand on the 
meaning and scope of that holding and its necessary 
implications.  
 Where the BIA has applied this authorization 
requirement, it has generally also interpreted the statute to 
impose a limiting definition on the word “subgroup.”1  This 
definition has two features.  First, the term “subgroup” covers 
only “significant” subgroups.  See, e.g., Addendum at 8 (BIA 
opinion, Dec. 16, 2016) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 107-236, at 63 
(2001)).  Second, the term applies only “where there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that [the subgroup] is 
subordinate to, or affiliated with, [the larger group] and [the 
subgroup] is dependent on, or otherwise relies upon, [the larger 
group] in whole or in part to support or maintain its 
                                              
1 In these cases, the BIA also tends to adopt an additional 
limitation from a subsequent Seventh Circuit case, Khan v. 
Holder, 766 F.3d 689, 699 (7th Cir. 2014).  A person is not 
subject to the terrorist bar if they did not know, and reasonably 
should not have known, that the organization they were a part 
of was a terrorist organization.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI).  The Seventh Circuit observed that, in 
light of the authorization requirement, “a person may not know 
whether he is supporting a terrorist organization until he knows 
which acts are authorized.”  Khan, 766 F.3d at 699 (emphasis 
omitted).  
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operations.”  Id. (quoting 9 Foreign Affairs Manual § 302.6-
2(B)(3)(h)).   
 These limitations on what can constitute a “subgroup” 
in this context are interdependent with the authorization 
requirement and required by our interpretation.  A Tier III 
terrorist organization is “a group of two or more individuals, 
whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup 
which engages in” terrorist activity.  8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).  As a matter of statutory structure, we 
cannot understand what it means for a group to engage in 
terrorist activity unless we also understand what it means for a 
subgroup to do so.  If the relevant “subgroup” could be defined 
as “whichever individuals committed terrorist acts,” then every 
single group (of whatever size, shape, or formality) that 
happens to have two members committing terrorist acts could 
be deemed a terrorist organization, regardless of the 
relationship between the members and the group.  
Accordingly, a limitation on what it means for a group to 
engage in terrorist activity requires a concurrent limitation on 
the meaning of “subgroup.”  Otherwise, the unauthorized 
activities of a group’s members—which we have held cannot 
render the group a terrorist organization—could always be re-
characterized as the activities of an unorganized subgroup, 
transforming the group back into a terrorist organization once 
more.  The authorization requirement would not function.  
Moreover, our concerns about the unintended potential for this 
statute to be extended to most, if not all, asylum-seekers, would 
go unaddressed. 
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 Thus, for the same interpretive reasons that we have 
found that the statute requires authorization,2 I would adopt the 
BIA’s two limiting definitions of the word “subgroup” as well.  
I would therefore counsel the BIA, as it applies our holding, to 
follow not only the holding of this opinion but that holding’s 
necessary corollaries, as it has often done in the past.  A group 
should not be declared a Tier III terrorist organization based on 
the actions of a subgroup unless that subgroup is “significant” 
and unless that subgroup “is subordinate to, or affiliated with, 
[the larger group] and [the subgroup] is dependent on, or 
otherwise relies upon, [the larger group] in whole or in part to 
support or maintain its operations.”  Addendum at 8 (BIA 
opinion, Dec. 16, 2016) (quoting 9 Foreign Affairs Manual § 
302.6-2(B)(3)(h)).  
                                              
2 Indeed, any interpretive path leads to this same result.  To the 
extent that the Seventh Circuit originally derived this 
authorization requirement from principles of constitutional 
avoidance, Hussain v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 
2008) (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 
886, 930-32 (1982)), a failure to limit the meaning of 
“subgroup” would also raise those same constitutional 
concerns.  The point is that so long as “subgroup” can mean 
“members,” there can be no effective distinction between the 
group’s activities and its members’ activities, under any 
framework. 
